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Explaining Apparent Changes in the 
Phillips Curve: Trend Inﬂ  ation Isn’t Constant
By Charles T. Carlstrom and Timothy S. Fuerst
Monetary policymakers look to the Phillips curve—an expression of the relationship between inﬂ  ation and the degree to 
which the economy is operating relative to its potential—for information about the cost of actions undertaken to lower 
inﬂ  ation. Recent estimations of the curve suggest it is deviating from historical norms. We argue that changes in trend 
inﬂ  ation and Fed operating procedures are not being taken into account in these estimations and that when they are, 
changes in the curve are minor and need not concern policymakers.
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With a dual mandate to control inﬂ  ation and maintain “full 
employment,” Federal Reserve policymakers have a keen 
interest in understanding the behavior of inﬂ  ation. One tool 
many have relied on as they try to achieve this mandate 
is the Phillips curve, which depicts links between inﬂ  ation 
(past, present, and future) and the output gap, that is, the 
percent by which actual output deviates from its potential. 
While periodically subject to criticism and revision, the 
curve has traditionally been viewed as a source of informa-
tion about the effects of changes in inﬂ  ation on output.
Those who follow it have recently noticed two important 
deviations from historical norms in certain aspects of the 
curve. First, the degree to which current inﬂ  ation depends 
on past inﬂ  ation—a relationship referred to as inﬂ  ation 
persistence—has declined rather dramatically. Second, the 
slope of the Phillips curve, which reﬂ  ects the relationship 
between current inﬂ  ation and the output gap, has declined 
almost as dramatically. 
But estimating the Phillips curve is fraught with problems, 
and it is possible that these observations reﬂ  ect quirks in es-
timation rather than real changes in the Phillips curve itself. 
In particular, an assumption implicit in estimating the curve 
is that long-term, or trend, inﬂ  ation is constant. The fact 
that it is not really constant is likely distorting the curve’s 
estimation. We investigate this question and ﬁ  nd that when 
we re-estimate the curve and allow for a changing and 
declining long-term inﬂ  ation trend, we obtain a different pic-
ture of the curve and a different interpretation of changes to 
it. Namely, the timing of the decline in inﬂ  ation persistence 
is likely to have occurred not in 2000 but around the early 
1980s, and while the slope of the Phillips curve has changed 
a little, the difference is not signiﬁ  cant. 
Moreover, the timing of the change in inﬂ  ation persistence 
suggests that the change may be a byproduct of a chang-
ing monetary policy environment. It roughly corresponds 
to the year in which the central bank changed its operating 
procedure (1983), adopting a more aggressive response to 
inﬂ  ation. Such a change in central bank behavior can make it 
seem as if the relationships underlying the Phillips curve have 
changed when they have not. (For the details of this argu-
ment, see the Recommended Readings.) All in all, we argue that 
the relationship between current inﬂ  ation and output that is 
implied by the Phillips curve has probably not changed. 
The Phillips Curve and Policy
If the relationships underlying the Phillips curve have 
changed, there are important policy implications. Both inﬂ  a-
tion persistence and the slope of the curve provide informa-
tion about the cost of actions undertaken to lower inﬂ  ation. 
The cost is referred to in terms of the curve’s sacriﬁ  ce ratio, 
which is the cumulative change in output associated with a 
permanent decline in inﬂ  ation of one percent. 
The slope of the curve determines how far output must 
fall below potential (that is, how much the output gap has 
to be widened) to lower inﬂ  ation one percentage point. If 
the slope of the Phillips curve has become ﬂ  atter, as recent 
evidence seems to suggest, it implies that the sacriﬁ  ce ratio is 
now larger, meaning the central bank must allow output to 
fall further below potential (that is, it must open up a larger 
gap) to achieve a given reduction in inﬂ  ation. Such an action 
would be implemented by increasing the federal funds rate.
Less inﬂ  ation persistence could also make it more costly to 
lower the inﬂ  ation rate permanently. When inﬂ  ation persis-
tence is high, changes in the fed funds rate have longer-last-
ing effects, and fewer changes are needed to achieve a given 
change in the inﬂ  ation rate. For example, with more inﬂ  ation 
persistence, an increase in the funds rate today will have an 
effect on inﬂ  ation tomorrow and will keep inﬂ  ation lower 
both today and in the future. This means fewer rate increas-
es would be needed in the future to keep inﬂ  ation down. 
With little inﬂ  ation persistence, things work in reverse. The 
interest rate increase necessary to lower inﬂ  ation would 
have a temporary effect, and more rate increases would be 
January 2008required in the future to keep inﬂ  ation low. 
Therefore, both weaker inﬂ  ation persistence and a ﬂ  at-
ter slope imply a larger sacriﬁ  ce ratio, which is especially 
troublesome for monetary policymakers. In either case, if 
the Fed wanted to permanently lower inﬂ  ation from, say, 
2 percent to 1.5 percent, a larger output gap would have to 
be opened up for a longer period of time. 
There is one positive policy implication associated with less 
inﬂ  ation persistence. Because less persistence implies that 
shocks to inﬂ  ation are temporary, when inﬂ  ation rises in the 
short term, policymakers may have the luxury of simply wait-
ing for inﬂ  ation to return to normal of its own accord rather 
than having to open an output gap to bring it back down. 
Changes in the Inﬂ  ation Process
Figures 1 and 2 show why many think that the inﬂ  ation 
process has fundamentally changed. The ﬁ  gures plot inﬂ  a-
tion persistence and the slope of the Phillips curve in rolling 
10-year windows, using the standard assumption that trend 
inﬂ  ation (the long-term inﬂ  ation target of the central bank) 
is constant over time. The slope of the Phillips curve shows 
the effect of the output gap on inﬂ  ation. From these ﬁ  gures, 
it appears that around 2000, inﬂ  ation persistence and the 
impact of the output gap on inﬂ  ation both declined substan-
tially. The curve’s slope, whose descent was interrupted by 
a brief blip, is now negative. However, the actual slope may 
not be negative, since pure chance could cause the estimate 
of a small positive slope to go negative. 
Yet the timing of the decline in inﬂ  ation persistence sug-
gests something else may be going on. Persistence begins to 
decline around 2000. Before then, every percentage point 
increase in the previous year’s inﬂ  ation was associated with 
almost a 1 percentage point increase in current inﬂ  ation. 
Six quarters later, that number had fallen to 0.4. Around 
the same time—1997—inﬂ  ation, which had been declining 
steadily since the early 1990s, began to level off (or even to 
increase slightly; see ﬁ  gure 3).
Since the Phillips curve holds ﬁ  xed the level of trend inﬂ  a-
tion, it tells us the degree of inﬂ  ation persistence and gives a 
slope curve for a given level of trend inﬂ  ation. But the drop 
in inﬂ  ation persistence appears to be occurring when trend 
inﬂ  ation was declining. The result is that persistence from 
the gradual fall in inﬂ  ation—and probably trend inﬂ  ation as 
well—before the late 1990s may have caused us to mismea-
sure both the slope and the amount of inﬂ  ation persistence 
in the Phillips curve. In particular, a sustained decrease in 
long-term inﬂ  ation could have picked up persistence in the 
declining inﬂ  ation trend, thereby artiﬁ  cially increasing mea-
sured inﬂ  ation persistence. Just because inﬂ  ation appears 
to be highly persistent when trend inﬂ  ation is slowly falling 
does not imply there will be persistence when it is fairly 
constant, as arguably has been the case since around the late 
1990s. 
To assess whether persistence in the inﬂ  ation trend has artiﬁ  cially 
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Notes: Inﬂ  ation is based on unﬁ  ltered core PCE data. Coefﬁ  cients are calculated using 
10-year rolling regressions of inﬂ  ation on the output gap and four-quarter lags of inﬂ  a-
tion. Inﬂ  ation persistence is deﬁ  ned as the sum of the four-quarter-lag coefﬁ  cients. 
Sources: BEA; the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The output gap is deﬁ  ned as the natural log of real gross domestic product 
less the natural log of potential gross domestic product, taken from the Congressio-
nal Budget Ofﬁ  ce. Output gap coefﬁ  cients are calculated using 10-year rolling regres-
sions of unﬁ  ltered inﬂ  ation data on the output gap and four-quarter lags of inﬂ  ation.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce; authors’ 
calculations.
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
1. Inﬂ  ation Persistence
2. Output Gap’s Effect on Inﬂ  ation
3. Core PCEof trend inﬂ  ation. One possibility is the projections of profession-
al forecasters, who are asked what they expect inﬂ  ation to aver-
age over the next 10 years. Their expectations are not a perfect 
substitute for trend or long-term inﬂ  ation expectations, which are 
expectations of what inﬂ  ation will be in 10 years. Nevertheless, 
the forecasters’ inﬂ  ation expectations suggest that the market 
anticipated a change in the long-run inﬂ  ation rate in the 1980s 
and 1990s that subsequently leveled off (see ﬁ  gure 4). 
Unfortunately, professional forecasters have only been 
polled since 1978, and even then there are noticeable gaps in 
the data. This and other drawbacks make these projections 
a poor choice for adjusting the raw inﬂ  ation data. They 
certainly would not allow us to investigate the hypothesis, 
proposed by some, that the high degree of inﬂ  ation persis-
tence in the 1970s was illusionary and existed because of a 
changing trend in inﬂ  ation. Indeed, over the entire sample, 
the inﬂ  ation series appears to have several different plateaus, 
starting low, ranging higher, and then falling back. 
Another approach is to proxy for long-term inﬂ  ation by 
smoothing the inﬂ  ation data. We smooth the data using the 
trend line shown in ﬁ  gure 5, which can be thought of as our 
rough estimate of the Fed’s long-term inﬂ  ation target. While 
clearly an imperfect measure of trend inﬂ  ation, it provides 
a clear and simple way of illustrating the impact a changing 
inﬂ  ation trend can have on measured inﬂ  ation persistence. 
Figures 6 and 7 show our estimates of inﬂ  ation persistence 
and the slope of the curve after controlling for changes in 
the long-run trend. The dramatic decline in inﬂ  ation persis-
tence that occurred around 2000 in the raw data has been 
pushed back to around 1990. The ﬂ  attening of the slope, 
which, as we said, reﬂ  ects the diminishing impact of the 
output gap on inﬂ  ation, has also been pushed back. Further-
more, the magnitude of the current decline in inﬂ  ation per-
sistence is historically unusual, but the decline in slope does 
not seem so much so. It is a modest decline, and its current 
value is not necessarily low by historical standards.
Phillips Curve, Same as It Ever Was
After correcting for changes in trend inﬂ  ation, our estimates 
suggest that there has been little change in the Phillips curve 
slope (thus little change in the output gap’s effect on inﬂ  a-
tion) but that inﬂ  ation persistence declined sharply starting 
in about 1990. Since these are 10-year rolling windows, the 
change that led to the decline in inﬂ  ation persistence could 
conceivably have occurred any time between 1980 and 1990. 
But did inﬂ  ation persistence in the Phillips curve really decline, 
or could there be other explanations for these estimates?
As always, it is difﬁ  cult to draw clear inferences from the 
data. Again, the timing of the change suggests several pos-
sible suspects, none of which actually implies a change in 
the underlying inﬂ  ation persistence in the curve. One is 
expected inﬂ  ation, which is another factor in the Phillips 
curve and which we estimated here by assuming a stable 
relationship between expected and past inﬂ  ation. Of course, 
the validity of this assumption is questionable, given the 
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5. Core PCE and Trend Inﬂ  ation
4. Inﬂ  ation Expectations
6. Inﬂ  ation Persistence (corrected)
Notes: Data are detrended using an HP ﬁ  lter (lambda = 1600).
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis; and the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce.
Sources: Survey of Professional Forecasters; and the Hoey Survey.
Notes: Variable long-term inﬂ  ation is based on HP-ﬁ  ltered core PCE data (lamb-
da = 1600). Coefﬁ  cients are calculated using 10-year rolling regressions of in-
ﬂ  ation on the output gap and four-quarter lags of inﬂ  ation. Inﬂ  ation persistence 
is deﬁ  ned as the sum of the four-quarter-lag coefﬁ  cients. 
Sources: BEA; Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce; authors’ calculations.
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new procedure probably reduced the amount of expected 
inﬂ  ation that is captured by past inﬂ  ation. 
As we argue in “Explaining Apparent Changes in the Phil-
lips Curve: The Great Moderation and Monetary Policy,” 
an increased reliance on inﬂ  ation targeting will make it 
appear as if the Phillips curve has changed when in fact it 
has remained constant. We also show that the decline in 
output variability that occurred around 1983 (the so-called 
“great moderation”) would have the same effect. 
Drawing inferences from data is always difﬁ  cult, but our 
ﬁ  ndings suggest that the measured declines in inﬂ  ation 
persistence and the slope of the Phillips curve are too small 
to suggest that the sacriﬁ  ce ratio has changed. Rather, the 
timing of the declines suggests that they could be artifacts 
of other changes, such as increased inﬂ  ation targeting and 
the decline in output variability. 
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“Explaining Apparent Changes in the Phillips Curve: The 
Great Moderation and Monetary Policy,” by Charles T. 
Carlstrom and Timothy S. Fuerst. 2008. Federal Reserve 
Bank of Cleveland, Economic Commentary (February).
7. Output Gap’s Effect on Inﬂ  ation 
(corrected)
Notes: The output gap is deﬁ  ned as the natural log of real gross domestic 
product less the natural log of potential gross domestic product, taken from 
the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce. The output gap coefﬁ  cients are calculated 
using 10-year rolling regressions of HP-ﬁ  ltered inﬂ  ation (lambda = 1600) on 
the output gap and four-quarter lags of inﬂ  ation.
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